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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new type of side channel
which is based on the ambient-light sensor employed in
today’s mobile devices. The pervasive usage of mobile
devices, i.e., smartphones and tablet computers and their
vast amount of sensors represent a plethora of side chan-
nels posing a serious threat to the user’s privacy and se-
curity. While recent advances in this area of research
focused on the employed motion sensors and the cam-
era as well as the sound, we investigate a less obvious
source of information leakage, namely the ambient light.
We successfully demonstrate that minor tilts and turns
of mobile devices cause variations of the ambient-light
sensor information. Thus, we are the first to show that
this sensor leaks sensitive information. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that these variations leak enough informa-
tion to infer a user’s personal identification number (PIN)
input based on a set of known PINs. Our results show
that we are able to determine the correct PIN—out of a
set of 50 random PINs—within the first ten guesses about
80% of the time. In contrast, the chance of finding the
right PIN by randomly guessing ten PINs would be 20%.
Since the data required to perform such an attack can be
gathered without any specific permissions or privileges,
the presented side channel seriously jeopardizes the se-
curity and privacy of mobile-device owners.
1 Introduction
Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablet com-
puters have become a ubiquitous part of our everyday
life. Powerful processors and a variety of sensors led
to manifold applications being developed on these de-
vices. Besides more general applications that allow users
to browse the Internet as well as to take and view pic-
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tures, more sophisticated applications like augmented-
reality applications and games also exist. However, these
devices are not solely employed for entertainment appli-
cations but also for handling business applications such
as banking transactions and payment services. This in
turn leads to sensitive information being processed on
these devices, which also attracts the attention of crimi-
nals and imposters aiming to steal money from users and
to spy on specific people through malicious applications.
Hence, the investigation of security and privacy compro-
mising threats is of utmost importance.
One potential source of security and privacy compro-
mising threats is denoted to side channels. Side chan-
nels represent unintended information leakage during
the operation of a device and potentially allow attack-
ers to recover secret information, as demonstrated by
Kocher [32] in 1996. Mobile devices include a myr-
iad of features and sensors that allow for many dif-
ferent attacks. While traditional side-channel attacks
against smartcards require expensive hardware, smart-
phones employ many different types of sensors that al-
ready represent a plethora of side channels themselves.
Thus, the “hardware” required to perform side-channel
attacks is provided for free.
In other words, besides providing useful information,
these sensors also represent a variety of threats to the
user’s security and privacy. Though Android employs a
permission system to prevent malicious access to specific
device resources, many of the employed sensors do not
require any permission at all. This exacerbates the sever-
ity of these vulnerabilities since applications without any
specific permissions might be able to exploit these side
channels, something that has already been demonstrated
impressively. For instance, Marquardt et al. [34] devel-
oped an application intended to run on a smartphone that
is capable of recovering keyboard inputs of nearby key-
boards. In this case, the application exploits the vibra-
tions recorded via the accelerometer sensor. In 2012,
Aviv et al. [8] demonstrated the possibility of extracting
the personal identification number (PIN) and the pattern
unlock mechanism by exploiting the information pro-
vided by the accelerometer sensor in smartphones. In
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addition, Miluzzo et al. [36] have shown how to extract
pressed keys from the accelerometer sensor in combina-
tion with the gyroscope sensor. In 2013, Simon and An-
derson [45] demonstrated how to infer PINs through the
camera and the microphone. However, compared to the
work of Simon and Anderson, our attack does not re-
quire any permission and it does not signal the capturing
of sensor data via audio-visual feedback. For instance,
like the shutter sound or the LED while taking images
with the camera.
The importance of research in this area has been em-
phasized by Becher et al. [13]. In order to raise aware-
ness about such attacks and to develop effective coun-
termeasures, these vulnerabilities must be reported and
analyzed extensively. To this end, we show how the am-
bient light of the user’s environment seriously affects the
system’s security and privacy. This is due to the fact
that today’s mobile devices are also equipped with a light
sensor that provides information about the ambient light.
The most common usage of this sensor is to adjust the
screen brightness depending on the light intensity. How-
ever, due to slight tilts and turns during the operation of
the device, the information provided by the sensor al-
lows an attacker to infer the input provided by the user.
In this paper, we investigate the sensitive information
leaked through this sensor.
Contribution. The contributions of this work can be
summarized as follows. First, we show that the light
sensor employed in today’s mobile devices actually rep-
resents a new type of side channel that leaks the user’s
input like the secret PIN input. Second, we observed
that the light sensor of modern smartphones also cap-
tures the red, green, blue, and white (RGBW) intensities
which leaks even more information and improves the ac-
curacy of the attack. Third, we provide practical insights
into the ways in which this side channel can be exploited
to gather the secret PIN input of the user by employing
machine-learning algorithms. Fourth, we discuss poten-
tial mitigation techniques to prevent the exploitation of
sensor-based side channels.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. In Section 2 we start with a basic investigation
of the ambient-light sensor and provide an insight into
the information leaked through this sensor. Section 3 out-
lines one potential attack scenario which takes advantage
of this side channel to recover the secret PIN input pro-
vided by the user. Later on, in Section 4, we detail how
the leaked information is actually exploited by employ-
ing machine-learning algorithms. In Section 5 we ex-
tensively analyze the information gathered and provide
detailed evaluations regarding the applicability and re-
liability of this attack. We cover limitations of the pre-
Figure 1: Samsung Galaxy SIII with (1) the proximity
and ambient-light sensor as well as (2) the front camera.
Rate parameter Sample rate
SensorManager.SENSOR DELAY FASTEST (0) ∼ 750 Hz
SensorManager.SENSOR DELAY GAME (1) ∼ 49 Hz
SensorManager.SENSOR DELAY UI (2) ∼ 15 Hz
SensorManager.SENSOR DELAY NORMAL (3) ∼ 5 Hz
Table 1: Sampling rates on the Samsung Galaxy SIII.
sented attack in Section 6 and we provide a brief analysis
of countermeasures to prevent such attacks in Section 7.
Last but not least, we discuss related work in Section 8
and present a conclusion for this paper in Section 9.
2 Ambient-Light Sensor
The ambient-light sensor employed in many of today’s
mobile devices provides information about the intensity
of the surrounding illumination. Figure 1 illustrates the
proximity and ambient-light sensor as well as the front
camera on a Samsung Galaxy SIII, which acts as our
test device. The information reported from the ambient-
light sensor is given in SI lux units, which measures
the intensity of illumination of a surface. This informa-
tion is used to adapt the screen brightness appropriately.
For instance, outside in direct sunlight the screen bright-
ness must be increased to remain readable, whereas in
darker surroundings the screen is dimmed to reduce eye
fatigue [44].
The ambient-light sensor can be accessed via
the Android Sensor API [5] that allows appli-
cations to register listeners which are notified
about changes of the sensor values. The an-
droid.hardware.SensorManager.registerListener(...)
method accepts a rate parameter which determines
how fast the events should be reported. Table 1 shows
the resulting sampling frequencies for the different
rate parameters according to our observations on the
Samsung Galaxy SIII smartphone running Android 4.3.
We determined the number of reported values over a
period of 10 seconds for each of the listed parameters
and we observed that about 750 measurement samples
can be gathered per second. We also observed a sensor
resolution of 1 lux, i.e., the smallest detectable change
2
Figure 2: PIN input mask to gather test samples.
is 1 lux. Furthermore, the ambient-light sensor can be
accessed without any specific permission which allows
malicious applications to access this sensor information
without raising any suspicion.
The next step in determining the applicability of the
light-sensor information regarding side-channel attacks
is to test the sensitivity, i.e., whether operating the smart-
phone actually results in changes of the information pro-
vided by the sensor. Therefore, we developed an Android
application that randomly generates a 4-digit PIN and ex-
pects the user to enter this PIN on the provided PIN pad.
Figure 2 illustrates a screenshot of this application. Dur-
ing the input of the PIN the application collects the infor-
mation provided by the ambient-light sensor as well as
the corresponding timestamp of the reported value. Fur-
thermore, we store a timestamp when a button is clicked
as well as the digit of the clicked button itself. We col-
lected this information for five consecutive PIN inputs
and visualized the gathered information in Figure 3. For
the sake of clarity we also plotted the corresponding dig-
its of the PIN and, as can be seen in this plot, a recurring
pattern for different digits of the PIN (1-5-9-0) can be
observed. These differences in the light intensity dur-
ing the input of the PIN occur inevitably due to slight
tilts and turns while operating the smartphone. Figure 4
shows a schematic illustrating the tilts and turns leading
to variations of the reported sensor information. For in-
stance, assuming the light bulb being the main source of
light, then tilting the device to the left causes a decrease
of the reported lux value. Although we illustrate a point-
like light source, the attack also works for environments
that are uniformly lit via tube lights.
Note that the PIN input mask can be aligned on the
top or on the bottom of the screen. For instance, on our
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Figure 3: Light-sensor information for five consecutive
PIN inputs (1-5-9-0).
Figure 4: Schematic of information leakage caused by
tilts and turns of the smartphone.
test device the SIM-unlock PIN mask is aligned on the
top while the standard phone pad is aligned on the bot-
tom. However, our observations showed that the align-
ment does not influence the information leakage.
Accessing the ambient-light sensor does not require
special permissions and, hence, any malicious applica-
tion can gather the required information without raising
any suspicion. Contrary to the shutter sound or a LED
that indicate an active camera [4], there is not even an
audio-visual feedback that signals the user that data is
being collected with the sensor. Thus, we conclude that
the information provided by the ambient-light sensor can
be exploited in side-channel attacks, which means that
an attacker is able to determine the corresponding input
based on this information.
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Figure 5: RGB(W)-sensor information for five consecu-
tive PIN inputs (1-7-3-0).
2.1 RGB(W) Sensor
More recent smartphones, like the Samsung Galaxy
SIII [42] as well as the Samsung Galaxy S4 [41], also
employ an RGB(W) sensor which is capable of reporting
the red, green, blue, and white (RGBW) intensities of the
ambient light. Samsung refers to this sensor as an RGB
sensor, but since it also reports the white intensity of the
ambient light we refer to it as RGB(W) sensor. Accord-
ing to the official Blog of Samsung Electronics [44], the
RGB sensor is used to optimize the screen brightness and
sharpness to prevent eye fatigue.
The Android API does not yet support RGB(W)
sensors, not even the latest version (Android 4.4
KitKat [3]). Thus, a workaround is necessary to re-
trieve the desired sensor values from the virtual file
system directly. On the Samsung Galaxy SIII reading
/sys/devices/virtual/sensors/light sensor/raw data yields
the RGBW values of the color sensor. We verified
the correctness of these values through the Service
Menu [26]—accessible by entering *#0*# on the phone
pad—which reports the same values.
Figure 5 illustrates the data of the same experiment as
mentioned above, but this time we also include the infor-
mation provided by the RGB(W) sensor. Due to reasons
of readability, we plotted only every 10-th value of the
red, green, blue, and white intensities. We observe that
all curves, i.e., red, green, blue, and white as well as the
lux values, show a similar curve. However, the intensity
of the blue light seems to provide a smoother curve than
the other four values. Again, we plotted the event of a
digit input for the sake of clarity and labeled each event
appropriately. For this specific plot we observe that the
“OK” button leads to a rather heavy decrease of the lux
value as well as the RGBW intensities.
Our observations show that the RGBW information
provides additional information that can be exploited,
i.e., additional features to be used for the machine-
learning algorithm later on. Again, no specific permis-
sions or super-user privileges are required, even though
a workaround is necessary to gather the RGB(W)-sensor
information.
3 Attack Scenario
In this section, we outline one possible attack scenario.
Based on this scenario, we will later on illustrate the in-
dividual steps to reproduce the actual exploitation of the
light-sensor information by employing machine-learning
techniques. Since the captured light-sensor information
reflects the user’s ambient-light conditions, a generic at-
tack is not possible. More formally, the user needs to
provide the data to be used to train the machine-learning
algorithm in the same environmental setting as the ac-
tual data which is to be classified later on. Hence, we
consider the following situation as a possible attack sce-
nario.
3.1 Training Phase
A hand-crafted application, i.e., an addicting game, is
used to gather the light-sensor information during the
user’s interaction with the smartphone. The application
in question tricks the user into operating the smartphone
in a way that is similar to the input of multiple PINs.
For example, an application similar to Math Trainer [46]
could be used, where the user is supposed to solve math-
ematical puzzles and to enter numbers which can be seen
as PINs. During our tests we even observed that a game
where the number of correctly entered PINs in the short-
est period of time could also serve as an addicting game.
We assume that users play such games in the living
room while watching TV, in a waiting room while wait-
ing for an appointment, or during a train ride. Hence,
even though mobile devices are carried around all the
time, there are still many opportunities to gather the re-
quired data from users operating the smartphone with-
out walking around. Furthermore, a recent study per-
formed by the UK’s Office of Communications [48]
coined the term media stacking, which refers to the fact
that about half of UK’s adults conduct their smartphone
or tablet computer while watching TV. Thus, our as-
sumption seems to be reasonable and the outlined attack
scenario is rather realistic.
The game, as outlined above, might only be able to
capture a limited number of “PINs” to be used for the
classification of the unknown PIN. However, as has been
shown in 2012 by Bonneau et al. [17] as well as Jakob-
sson and Liu [29], people tend to choose specific PINs
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like dates as well as PINs that represent common four-
digit words, e.g., “love” (5683). Thus, taking research
about the users’ tendency to choose PINs into consider-
ation, a set of commonly used PINs could be established
and might be enough to determine the correct one. The
above mentioned game can be used to learn this set of
commonly used PINs.
In case computing power for the machine-learning al-
gorithm is required, i.e., a powerful server, the applica-
tion requires an Internet connection to transmit the gath-
ered data to this powerful intermediary. Nevertheless,
we argue that convincing the user that the application re-
quires the Internet permission is easy. For instance, to
retrieve high scores or information about new updates,
new games, etc. Thus, we claim that the proposed attack
can be performed without raising the user’s suspicion.
3.2 Exploitation Phase
After gathering enough samples, the application tricks
the user into restarting the device or starting the desired
application, e.g., the banking application, just to capture
the light-sensor information during the input of the au-
thentication PIN. If one considers to attack the smart-
phone’s PIN, a service can be implemented to be started
on boot time. Afterwards the sensor information cap-
tured during the game play is used to deduce the un-
known PIN input by means of machine learning. Note
that the game, e.g., Math Trainer, might also trick the
user into buying a specific add-on, a “new level”, or a
“new stage”. When the user performs the in-app billing
via Google Wallet, the game skims the corresponding au-
thentication PIN.
Now one might question whether the revealed PIN is
of any value for the attacker. In fact, if the attacker later
gains physical access to the mobile device, she might
gain access to the mobile device by unlocking the phone,
or even worse, might cause financial damage by authenti-
cating herself to the corresponding application using the
correct PIN. Furthermore, Aviv et al. [8] argued that the
learned PIN might be valuable in case the user reuses
the PIN, for instance, as the ATM PIN. In addition, Si-
mon and Anderson [45] predict that the number of smart-
phone applications requiring an authentication PIN will
increase over time. Hence, users might be tempted to
reuse one PIN across different applications, which exac-
erbates PIN-skimming vulnerabilities. Overall, we con-
sider the presented attack as a serious threat for today’s
mobile devices.
3.3 Security Implications
Simon and Anderson [45] state that sensor-based side-
channel attacks are capable to overcome strong separa-
tion mechanisms like BlackBerry Balance [15] or Sam-
sung KNOX [43]. These mechanisms try to separate the
“private” world from the “business” world in order to
provide greater protection of corporate data on smart-
phones. However, based on the leaking sensor informa-
tion, an unprivileged application running in the “private”
world of the smartphone might gain knowledge of sen-
sitive information entered in the “business” world. It is
important to note that the presented attack is also capa-
ble to overcome these separation mechanisms, if unpriv-
ileged applications running in the “private” world are al-
lowed to access the ambient-light sensor during the oper-
ation of the “business” world. Furthermore, since Black-
Berry smartphones also support the execution of Android
applications and the BlackBerry Runtime 10.0 [16] also
supports the ambient-light sensor, a malicious applica-
tion developed for Android smartphones might also harm
BlackBerry-based devices.
3.4 Observations and Assumptions
The scenario outlined above is based on some observa-
tions and assumptions which are detailed within the fol-
lowing paragraphs. Considering a PIN-input mask as il-
lustrated in Figure 2, and a user operating the smartphone
with only one hand, using the thumb to enter the digits,
we make the following observations. Left-handed per-
sons tilt the smartphone slightly to the left side when en-
tering PIN digits in the middle and right column of the
key pad, i.e., 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9. In contrast, right-handed
persons tilt the smartphone slightly to the right side when
entering PIN digits in the left and middle column, i.e., 1,
2, 4, 5, 7, 8. We attribute this observation to the fact that
people might possibly drop the device if operating it the
other way round. Furthermore, this slightly moves the
display towards the thumb, i.e., the users slightly push
the display towards their thumb. These tilts of the device
cause the variations in the captured light-sensor informa-
tion. Similarly, we assume fewer tilts and turns of the
mobile device if it is held with one hand and operated
with the index finger of the other hand or a stylus pen.
Assumption 1. We assume the user is holding the mo-
bile device in his hands rather than laying it onto a flat
surface while operating it. If we would assume the mo-
bile device is lying on a stable surface, i.e., a table, the
light-sensor information would not change during the op-
eration of the device, unless the user’s hand causes the
light-sensor changes.
Assumption 2. Furthermore, we assume that the PIN
is entered on a key pad similar to the one illustrated in
Figure 2 rather than a QWERTY keyboard with a sin-
gle row of numbers. Examples of applications that are
5
“protected” with an authentication PIN are, for instance,
AppLock [21], Evernote [22], and KeepSafe [30], as
well as mobile banking applications, e.g., Barclays [12],
and NAB [37], just to name a few of them. Screen-
shots of these applications—provided by the correspond-
ing developers—clearly show that the authentication PIN
is entered on a key pad as illustrated in Figure 2. Hence,
this seems to be a rather fair assumption which does not
have a negative impact on the attack scenario.
Assumption 3. We also assume that the user operates
the mobile device in an environment where the ambient-
light sensor faces a sufficiently large variance of the am-
bient light during the operation of the device. This is
not the case in completely dark environments. However,
also rather gloomy environments, i.e., a room in the late
afternoon without any artificial light source, can be con-
sidered for potential attack scenarios, at least in case the
lux values vary slightly during the handling of the device.
4 Attack Approach
In this section, we detail the steps for the exploitation of
the light-sensor information. As outlined in the scenario
above, we perform a matching of sensor values captured
during the input of an unknown PIN to the sensor values
of known PINs. In terms of machine learning this rep-
resents a classification problem, where a so-called fea-
ture vector is mapped to a finite number of labels or cat-
egories, i.e., PINs in our case. The required steps are
as follows: (1) gathering the sensor values under known
PINs as well as the sensor values under unknown PINs,
and (2) employing machine-learning techniques to deter-
mine the unknown PINs based on the set of known PINs.
In order to perform the classification, sensor val-
ues and the corresponding PINs are used to train the
machine-learning algorithm. This data is referred to as
training data. The actual data that is to be classified is
known as test data. We stick to the notation of Alpay-
din [2] and Bishop [14], i.e., bold letters denote vec-
tors and a superscript T denotes the transpose of a vec-
tor. Furthermore, uppercase bold letters denote matrices.
Vectors are assumed to be column vectors by default.
4.1 Gathering the Required Data
The gathering of the required training data during game
play can be formalized as follows. The malicious ap-
plication captures a list of tuples (t,L,R,G,B,W ), with t
being the timestamp and L, R, G, B, and W representing
the lux information, as well as the red, green, blue, and
white intensities of the ambient light. Furthermore, we
capture a list of tuples (tp,d), with tp being the times-
tamp of a pressed digit d ∈ {0, . . . ,9} of the p-th PIN. In
our scenario one PIN consists of four consecutive tuples
in this list. The two timestamps t and tp allow us to prop-
erly align the event of a pressed digit with the data of the
ambient-light sensor later on.
For each PIN we extract the sequence of sensor values
within the period defined by the timestamp of the first
digit and the timestamp of the last digit of the PIN. In
addition, one might consider a timeframe of a few mil-
liseconds before and after the input of the first and the
last digit of one PIN, which covers additional informa-
tion. The resulting matrix M for one PIN is as follows.
M =
(t,L,R,G,B,W )1...
(t,L,R,G,B,W )l

Every column within matrix M represents the corre-
sponding sensor information during the input of one spe-
cific PIN, except the first one which represents the times-
tamp at which the information was captured. Before the
gathered information can actually be exploited, we nor-
malize the sensor values appropriately. This normaliza-
tion of the data is done either by dividing each value (L,
R, G, B, W ) in one column by the norm of the corre-
sponding column vector, or by rescaling the values via,
e.g., Li = (Li−min(L))/(max(L)−min(L)).
The data of matrix M is then used to derive the actual
feature vectors. While Owusu et al. [38] consider a large
number of features and employ special feature selectors
to determine the actual set of features to be used, we keep
the feature space simple and stick to a limited number
of features for a first investigation. These features are
outlined briefly within the following paragraphs.
Lux Values Only. The first set of feature vectors we
consider are the exact lux values at the input of each spe-
cific digit of the PIN. Therefore, we use the timestamp
of each input event during one PIN input to look-up the
corresponding values in matrix M. We represent these
values as a vector x = [L1,L2,L3,L4]T, where the sub-
script refers to a specific digit of the PIN.
Lux Values Including RGBW Values. The second set
of feature vectors we consider are the exact lux values in-
cluding the red, green, blue, and white (RGBW) intensi-
ties at the input of each digit for one specific PIN, repre-
sented as x = [L1,R1,G1,B1,W1, . . . ,L4,R4,G4,B4,W4]T.
In the following we refer to the feature vector comprised
of these five features as LRGBW.
Polynomial of Degree 3. The third possibility we con-
sider is fitting a polynomial of degree 3 through the sec-
ond column of M. More formally, through all lux values
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during one PIN input. The coefficients of this polyno-
mial f (x) = ax3+bx2+cx+d are then considered as the
features of a specific PIN, i.e., x = [a,b,c,d]T. The co-
efficients for the red, green, blue, and white intensities—
the remaining columns of M—are obtained in the same
manner and appended to the feature vector x.
After gathering the data as outlined above, any set
of the above outlined feature vectors is then com-
bined into a matrix Fn with n rows, i.e., one row
for each PIN. Furthermore, a label or class vector
cn = [(d1,d2,d3,d4)1, . . . ,(d1,d2,d3,d4)n] of tuples cor-
responding to the PIN-digits can be derived.
Fn =
x1...
xn
 , cn =
(d1,d2,d3,d4)1...
(d1,d2,d3,d4)n

The matrix Fn as well as the label vector cn are then used
to train the classification algorithm.
4.2 Detecting PIN Inputs
The above outlined approach of gathering the feature
vectors can be performed in a real attack because the
data for training the machine-learning algorithm can be
captured during game play, in which situation all of this
information is available, including the timestamp of a
pressed digit. However, during the input of the unknown
PIN the timestamp is not known and hence we need a
mechanism to determine the PIN input on a sequence
of sensor values. Therefore, the approach mentioned by
Miluzzo et al. [36] might be used. Their idea is to move
“windows” of a fixed length (the length of an average
PIN input time) over the sensor data and try to detect the
input. Another approach by Simon and Anderson [45]
suggests to use the microphone to capture the vibrations
of the haptic feedback to determine when a button on
the touchscreen has been pressed. While the former ap-
proach does not require any specific permission, the lat-
ter approach requires a permission to access the micro-
phone. However, we consider the detection of PIN inputs
on a sequence of sensor values as solved and beyond the
scope of this work. Thus, we gather the test data, i.e., the
data to be classified, in the same way as the training data.
4.3 Determining the Unknown PIN
After we gathered the required light-sensor information
for all the PINs (Fn and cn) to be used for the train-
ing phase of the machine-learning algorithm, we start
the actual training phase. Therefore, we employ Mat-
lab’s Statistics Toolbox [35] with its extensive features
and machine-learning algorithms. We perform the out-
lined attack by employing a supervised learning algo-
rithm, which tries to learn a function and its parameters
based on labeled training data. This function is later on
used to determine the label of unseen data. More for-
mally, given a set of tuples (xi,ci), with xi ∈ Rn being a
feature vector and ci the corresponding label of the obser-
vation, the algorithm tries to infer a function f : X →C,
where X ∈ Rn represents the feature vector of an obser-
vation and C the inferred label.
Choosing the right classification algorithm seems to be
some kind of “mystery”. For instance, related work by
Miluzzo et al. [36]—who try to infer input from the ac-
celerometer sensor and the gyroscope sensor—takes the
approach of employing ensemble techniques. This means
that they train several different classification algorithms,
and finally they employ a majority-voting scheme to
choose the final classification result. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we investigate three different classification algo-
rithms and compare their results afterwards. We briefly
outline the chosen classification algorithms in the follow-
ing paragraphs. For further information about these algo-
rithms we refer to [2, 14].
Multiclass Logistic Regression. The classifier tries to
learn parameters wk for every class label k ∈C, such that
a vector x is assigned to label k in case p(k|x) > p( j|x)
for all j 6= k, with p defined as below.
p(k|x) = exp
(
wTk ·x
)
∑i exp(wiT ·x)
Discriminant Analysis. The classifier tries to learn pa-
rameters wk for every class label k ∈C, such that a vector
x is assigned to label k in case fk(x)> f j(x) for all j 6= k,
with f defined as below.
fk(x) = wTk ·x+wk0
More formally, when talking about discriminant analy-
sis we refer to the linear discriminant analysis, where
classes are separated linearly.
K-Nearest Neighbor Algorithm. The algorithm as-
signs the input vector x a label which is determined by
the majority of the K nearest neighbors. In our case, we
used K = 5. Usually, the Euclidean distance is used to
determine the distance between two vectors.
5 Evaluation and Results
We engaged a total of ten users to acquire the necessary
data for the evaluation of this information leakage. Each
user was asked to enter at least one set of random PINs
with cardinality k ∈ {15,30,50}, each PIN for a spe-
cific number of times N ∈ {3, . . . ,10}. If a PIN was en-
tered incorrectly, we ignore the corresponding input and
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prompt the user to enter the PIN again. Unless explicitly
stated, we always use the largest set of 50 PINs within
the following analysis. We basically follow the approach
of Aviv et al. [8] who also measured the performance of
their attack on a set of 50 PINs. In total we use the data
of 29 test runs gathered by a total of 10 users.
Evaluation Methodology. Since the performance of
the learned classifier could be distorted—either posi-
tively or negatively—when determined solely with the
gathered test data, we apply the concept of k-fold cross
validation. The purpose of this concept is to estimate
the average success rate of classifying unknown data into
one of the learned categories. Therefore, k-fold cross val-
idation partitions the set of training data into k equally-
sized sets. Afterwards, k−1 sets of the training data are
used to train the classifier and the remaining set is clas-
sified according to the learned categories to estimate the
performance. This process is repeated until all k possi-
ble sets have been used once as a test set. Afterwards
the average performance can be estimated. Compared to
the performance based solely on specific test data, the
concept of cross validation provides more reliable esti-
mations regarding the performance of a classifier [14].
Setup. We performed the experiments in rather uncon-
strained environments regarding the lighting conditions.
This means that tests were performed in office rooms that
were uniformly illuminated via tube lights, in a living
room with a standard ceiling lamp, and in rooms where
the only light source was a window. In the room where
the only light source was a window, we even considered
different daytimes, e.g., during the day and in the late af-
ternoon. However, we asked the users not to walk around
while entering the presented PINs, which is compliant
with the above outlined attack scenario. Furthermore,
we did not insist on a specific input method, but only
that the user holds the mobile device during the opera-
tion. As already explained above, operating the mobile
device while it is laying on a stable surface is unlikely
to cause variations of the light-sensor information. Al-
lowing users to choose their desired input method freely
yields more generic results because the users operate the
mobile device in their usual manner.
We watched the users during the gathering of the
measurement samples and observed the following input
methods:
1. Holding the smartphone in one hand and entering
the digits with the thumb of the same hand.
2. Holding the smartphone in one hand and entering
the digits with the thumb of the other hand.
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Figure 6: Average rate of correctly classified PINs over
multiple runs with a set of 15 PINs each.
3. Holding the smartphone in one hand and entering
the digits with the index finger of the other hand.
Within the following paragraphs we analyze the gath-
ered data with the proposed feature vectors and machine-
learning algorithms in order to determine whether the se-
cret PIN can be recovered based on a set of known PINs.
Comparison of Classification Algorithms. As out-
lined above, we employ three different classification al-
gorithms. Thus, our first intention is to determine the
overall classification rate based on different classifica-
tion mechanisms: (1) logistic regression, (2) discrimi-
nant analysis, and (3) k-nearest neighbor classification.
These classifiers are fed with the feature vectors: (a) the
lux values only (L), and (b) the lux values including the
RGBW values (LRGBW).
We applied a 10-fold cross validation on all three clas-
sifiers and evaluated the performance of the suggested
features for different numbers of samples (repetitions)
per PIN. Figure 6 illustrates the average rate of correctly
classified PINs out of a set of 15 known PINs for the dif-
ferent classifiers and the proposed feature vectors. The
y-axis represents the average rate of correctly classified
PINs, and the x-axis illustrates the number of gathered
samples (repetitions) per PIN. Given this plot, we ob-
serve that the feature vector comprised of the LRGBW
values outperforms the lux value only feature vector most
of the time for all classifiers. Thus, we conclude that the
additional information leaked through the RGB(W) sen-
sor leads to a better attack performance. We also observe
that the discriminant analysis provides better results than
the other two classifiers. Furthermore, the average rate
of correctly classified PINs increases with the number
of samples per PIN. For instance, if we perform a lin-
ear discriminant analysis with a training set of 15 PINs,
each repeated 8 times, then we are able to classify more
8
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Number of samples per PIN
R
at
e 
of
 c
or
re
ct
ly 
cla
ss
ifie
d 
PI
Ns
 
 
Logistic regression (L)
Logistic regression (LRGBW)
Discriminant analysis (L)
Discriminant analysis (LRGBW)
KNN (L)
KNN (LRGBW)
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multiple runs with a set of 50 PINs each.
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Figure 8: Average rate of correctly classified PINs over
multiple runs with a set of 15 PINs each.
than 80% of the PINs correctly. Note that the chance of
correctly guessing the right PIN from a set of 15 PINs
randomly is 115 = 6.7%.
Figure 7 illustrates the average rate of correctly clas-
sified PINs out of a set of 50 PINs. Again, the linear
discriminant analysis outperforms the other two classi-
fiers and the additional information from the RGB(W)
sensor increases the performance compared to the lux
value only. At first glance, an average rate of correctly
classified PINs of 40 to 50% seems to be quite moder-
ate. However, the chance of correctly guessing the right
PIN from a set of 50 PINs is 150 = 2%. Thus, our attack
outperforms random guessing by a factor of 20 to 25.
Comparison of Feature Vectors. Since we introduced
a feature vector which is comprised of a degree 3 poly-
nomial fitted through every value (e.g., lux and RGBW
values) during one PIN input, we need to compare the
performance of the plain features and the approximated
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Figure 9: Average rate of correctly classified PINs for
multiple guesses.
features. Figure 8 illustrates the respective performances
for these feature vectors based on a 10-fold cross valida-
tion over multiple runs with a set of 15 PINs. We observe
that both feature vectors yield a similar performance for
the different classification algorithms, with the discrimi-
nant analysis performing best. Based on this observation
we only focus on the discriminant analysis within the
following investigations.
Guessing PINs According to their Probability. An
interesting approach is to consider the fact that an adver-
sary is able to enter PINs for a specific number of times,
i.e., to guess possible PINs according to their probability
for being the correct one. In this case the probability of
finding the correct PIN increases with every tested PIN.
Thus, we sort potential PINs according to their probabil-
ity for being the correct one and illustrate the rate of cor-
rectly classified PINs after a specific number of guesses.
Figure 9 shows the average rate of correctly guessing
a PIN out of a set of 50 random PINs for a specific num-
ber of guesses. The additional information provided by
the RGB(W) sensor yields better results and seems to
increase the success rate by about 10 percentage points
compared to the lux value only feature vector. We also il-
lustrate the success rate if one were trying to guess PINs
randomly, which clearly shows the advantage of our at-
tack compared to random guessing.
When comparing our results to the results of Aviv et
al. [8], we observe that the ambient-light sensor pro-
vides results at least as good as those achieved by the ac-
celerometer sensor. Comparing our results to the work of
Simon and Anderson [45], we observe that the ambient-
light sensor provides even better results than the ap-
proach of exploiting the camera to infer PINs. For in-
stance, Simon and Anderson claim to infer more than
30% of the PINs after two guesses and more than 50% of
9
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Figure 10: Average rate of correctly classified PINs for
different input methods.
the PINs after five guesses. In contrast, the ambient-light
sensor allows us to infer about 50% of the PINs after two
guesses and about 65% of the PINs after five guesses.
The presented results indicate that guessing PINs ac-
cording to their probability provides an effective means
of finding the correct one. On average we are able to de-
termine the correct PIN with a probability of 80% when
considering the ten most probable PINs. In contrast,
guessing PINs randomly from a set of 50 PINs would
result in a success rate of 20% after ten guesses.
Impact of Different Input Methods. Since users em-
ploy different input methods, we investigate the impact
of an input method on the classification rate. To this end,
we compare the three major input methods:
1. Holding the device in one hand and using the thumb
of the same hand to operate it.
2. Holding the device in one hand and operating it with
the thumb of the other hand.
3. Holding the device in one hand and using the index
finger of the other hand to operate it.
Figure 10 illustrates the average rate of correctly clas-
sified PINs for the three different input methods after
guessing a specific number of the most probable PINs.
The plot is based on a 10-fold cross validation consider-
ing a discriminant analysis on the LRGBW values. The
underlying set of PINs had a cardinality of 15. According
to this plot the two input methods involving the thumb,
i.e., left hand and right thumb as well as right hand and
right thumb, seem to be more vulnerable to this attack
than the one with the index finger. This is due to the
fact that the mobile device usually undergoes only mi-
nor movements when the index finger is used, because
User Input method
User 1 Left hand and index finger
User 2 Right hand and right thumb
User 3 Left hand and index finger
Table 2: Input methods of three users.
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Figure 11: Average rate of correctly classified PINs for
three specific users on a set of 30 PINs.
one hand is solely used to hold the mobile device. How-
ever, this is not entirely correct because also for the input
method involving the left hand and the right thumb one
hand is solely used to hold the mobile device.
To gain further insight into factors affecting the rate
of correctly classified PIN inputs, we compare the pro-
vided data of three different users. The corresponding
input methods of these users are illustrated in Table 2.
All three users entered 30× 3 PINs, i.e., each of the 30
PINs was entered 3 times, within the same room under
the same environmental conditions regarding the ambi-
ent light. Figure 11 illustrates the result of the 10-fold
cross validation of the three data sets provided by User
1, User 2, and User 3, respectively. The input method
of User 2 seems to leak the most information. This ap-
pears to be due to the fact that she rested her upper arm
against her upper body in a relaxed manner and operated
the smartphone in a very comfortable way. User 1 placed
her elbows on her knees and also operated the device in a
very relaxed way. In contrast, User 3 tightly pressed her
upper arm against the upper body and held the device
very firmly in her hand while entering the digits with the
index finger. Based on the investigations of these three
users, we observe that though the input method seems to
have an impact on the classification rate, a general state-
ment regarding the security or insecurity of a specific in-
put method is difficult to make. Nevertheless, we claim
that the tighter and more firmly one holds the device, the
less information is leaked. To put it more generally, the
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Figure 12: Average rate of correctly classified PINs for
different sampling rates based on a set of 15 PINs.
more movements the mobile device undergoes during the
operation, the more information is leaked.
Impact of the Sampling Frequency. As outlined in
Section 2, the ambient-light sensor can be configured
to operate with a variety of different sampling frequen-
cies. With a sampling frequency of 750 Hz the Samsung
Galaxy SIII provides an immense number of measure-
ment samples per second, far more than is necessary for
a successful attack. In fact, most of our attacks were per-
formed with a sampling frequency between 5 and 50 Hz,
though we performed successful attacks with all possible
sampling frequencies.
Figure 12 indicates that the lowest sampling frequency
supported by our device (5 Hz) is actually enough to per-
form the presented attack. The plot illustrates that the
performance does not even decrease when sampling with
the lowest frequency of 5 Hz.
Demonstrating that an attack can be performed with a
low sampling frequency is more important than demon-
strating its success on a high sampling frequency. This is
due to the fact that multiple devices are already equipped
with such a sensor and upcoming mobile devices are
most likely equipped with more powerful RGB(W) sen-
sors, i.e., supporting higher sampling frequencies and
resolutions.
Though we did not observe any problems with the
lowest sampling frequency on the Samsung Galaxy SIII,
we note that even lower sampling frequencies potentially
might prevent this attack. This is due to the fact that for
sampling frequencies below 5 Hz too few measurement
samples might be gathered if one enters the PIN too fast.
6 Limitations
The presented attack also has some limitations. First,
our model does not consider mistyped PINs. If a user
deletes an incorrect digit and enters the correct digit af-
terwards we are not able to infer the correct PIN any-
more. Nevertheless, related work does not cover this case
neither. Second, we did not evaluate our attack outside
under sunny, foggy or cloudy light conditions. However,
we evaluated the attack in a room—where the only light
source was a window—during different daytimes. Fur-
thermore, the data used to train the machine-learning al-
gorithm must be gathered in the same environment as the
actual data that should be classified. Nevertheless, our at-
tack scenario is based on the assumption that people use
their smartphone while watching TV, while waiting in a
waiting room, or during a train ride, which seems to be
a reasonable assumption. Future work, however, might
investigate whether a more general model can be estab-
lished in order to decouple the training phase from the
actual attack phase. For instance, a “calibration” phase
might be used to determine the overall light conditions
in the user’s environment to speed-up the training phase.
Third, due to the fact that the presented attack is based
on the ambient-light sensor, it does not work in case the
user operates the mobile device in a completely dark en-
vironment. Though, a completely dark environment also
prevents an attack that exploits the camera [45].
7 Analysis of Countermeasures
In this section, we discuss potential mitigation tech-
niques to prevent the exploitation of sensor information.
UI and API Modifications. Aviv et al. [8] argue that
an effective security mechanism would be to prevent un-
trusted applications from accessing motion sensors, at
least during the input of sensitive information. However,
the crucial question is: When is an input considered as
being sensitive? Clearly, the input of an authentication
PIN or a password represents a sensitive input. But what
about the input while writing an e-mail or the data en-
tered in forms on websites? Perhaps the sensors should
be disabled as soon as the virtual keyboard is displayed?
However, this renders applications that rely on these sen-
sors completely useless as is also stated by Aviv et al. [8].
Owusu et al. [38] suggest to vary the keyboard layout
for sensitive inputs, which means that buttons are rear-
ranged on the virtual keyboard prior to every sensitive
input. The drawback of such countermeasures is the dra-
matic decrease of usability. While this might be appli-
cable for a PIN pad, it would definitely undermine the
usability of the QWERTY keyboard layout.
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Limiting the resolution and the sampling frequency
of the sensor might be another possible countermeasure.
For instance, the ambient-light sensor is currently used
to adapt the screen brightness. For such an application a
more coarse resolution as well as a lower sampling fre-
quency should be sufficient. We are not aware of any sce-
nario that requires a sampling frequency of 50 Hz or even
750 Hz. As we have shown in this paper, even the lowest
sampling frequency of 5 Hz on the Samsung Galaxy SIII
does not prevent the presented attack. However, reducing
the sampling frequency to 1-2 Hz should suffice for the
task of adapting the screen brightness and to hedge the
presented attack. Furthermore, since only the OS per-
forms the task of adapting the screen brightness, access
to this sensor might be restricted to the OS exclusively.
While these countermeasures might be quite effective,
they limit the functionality of specific applications, e.g.,
games that heavily rely on the usage of sensors.
Rethinking the Permission Model. A quite sophisti-
cated countermeasure might be a fine-grained permis-
sion system in mobile operating systems. Felt et al. [24]
evaluated different permission-granting mechanisms in-
cluding automatic granting, trusted UIs (cf. Roesner et
al. [40]), runtime-consent dialogs, and install-time warn-
ings. After considering their model we conclude that an
effective countermeasure would be an install-time warn-
ing, i.e., to pause the installation process and to explicitly
inform or warn the user about the requested permission.
Specific risks that might arise from permissions must
be communicated to the user, as has also been reported
by Felt et al. [25], especially since the manifold permis-
sions confuse many users [25, 31]. However, excessive
warnings lose effectiveness and might cause users to ig-
nore these warnings again. In order to overcome this
problem Peng et al. [39] suggest to rank applications ac-
cording to their risks rather than using a binary decision
for the classification of vulnerable applications. This
ranking decision is based on the requested permissions
of applications that are known to be malware. Based on
such a ranking users might make more deliberate deci-
sions regarding the installation of applications. However,
such rankings are only applicable if the motion sensors as
well as the ambient-light sensor are considered within the
permission system of the OS, which calls for security-
specific actions of operating-system developers.
Application Analysis. A similar approach might be
achieved by extending AppGuard [11]—an Android ap-
plication to enforce security policies—to support the de-
tection of possibly unwanted sensor accesses by mali-
cious applications. AppGuard could scan applications
during the installation and inform the user about sen-
sor accesses that potentially leak sensitive information.
Other malware-analysis applications such as static ana-
lyzers, e.g., Stowaway [23] or AndroidLeaks [27], or ap-
plications like VirusTotal [49] could also be extended to
check applications for malicious sensor accesses.
User Behavior. Another possible countermeasure
might be to enter sensitive data only in environments
without any light source and with the index finger or a
stylus pen. However, in this case other sensors, e.g., mo-
tion sensors, might still be exploitable. So, for really sen-
sitive data, the user might cover the ambient-light sensor
as well as the camera, e.g., with her finger, and place the
mobile device on a flat surface while providing the input.
Encouraging users to choose longer PINs and pass-
words might also increase the security [45]. However,
some applications do not even allow PINs with more than
4–5 digits. Again, the drawback of such countermeasures
is the decreasing usability.
Last but not least, awareness must be raised amongst
users. Applications should not be able to gather informa-
tion without knowledge of the user and users must be en-
couraged to be wary when installing applications, which
is why studies like this one are essential.
8 Related Work
Side-channel attacks on input devices in general have
been shown to occur both directly [6, 33, 47] as well
as indirectly, e.g., through oily residues on the touch-
screen [7], or through reflections of monitors [9, 10].
More specific investigations of threats represented by
sensor-based side channels on mobile devices include,
for instance, the work of Cai et al. [20]. They raised the
awareness regarding the camera, the microphone, and the
GPS signal in modern smartphones. In 2011, Cai and
Chen [18] claimed to be the first to show the privacy
risk of motion sensors utilized in smartphones. Han et
al. [28] used the accelerometer sensor to infer the loca-
tion of the device owner, even with the location-based
services deactivated. In 2012, Owusu et al. [38] em-
ployed the accelerometer sensor to infer passwords en-
tered on touchscreens. Miluzzo et al. [36] and Xu et
al. [50] made use of the accelerometer and motion sen-
sors in general to infer the locations of taps on touch-
screens. Recently, attacks have been presented to in-
fer unknown PIN inputs based on a set of learned PINs.
For instance, Aviv et al. [8] demonstrated such an attack
by exploiting the accelerometer and Simon and Ander-
son [45] demonstrated such an attack by exploiting the
camera and the microphone. We briefly compare related
attacks to our attack within the following paragraphs.
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Aviv et al. [8] Simon and Anderson [45] Ours
Sensor Accelerometer Camera Ambient-light sensor
Permissions Internet Camera, Internet Internet
Training Independent of user/location For each user individually For each user/environment individually
Drawbacks - LED and shutter sound on non-rooted devices Does not work in completely dark environments
Input method No constraints Thumb of holding hand No constraints
Accuracy 43% within 5 guesses 50% within 5 guesses 65% within 5 guesses
Table 3: Comparison of related work targeting a set of 50 PINs.
Comparison. Compared to attacks based on motion
sensors, a major advantage of the ambient-light sen-
sor is the power consumption. The method an-
droid.hardware.Sensor.getPower() returns the power in
mA used by the corresponding sensor while in use [5].
On our Samsung Galaxy SIII this method returns 0.2 mA
for the ambient-light sensor, 0.23 mA for the accelerom-
eter, and 6.1 mA for the gyroscope. Hence, the ambient-
light sensor consumes a factor of 30 less power than the
gyroscope, which means that our attack is less prone to
gain the user’s attention through battery drainage.
Table 3 provides a comprehensive comparison of the
related work that is similar to ours, i.e., attacks targeting
a specific set of PINs. All attacks assume to have Internet
access in order to transfer the gathered data to a power-
ful server that performs the machine learning. However,
as argued in Section 3, the Internet permission can be
gained rather easily without raising the user’s suspicion.
The main drawback of our attack is that users are not
allowed to walk around while entering the PINs because
the data is only exploitable for one specific environment.
Hence, the data cannot be reused for multiple attacks as
in case of Aviv et al. [7]. Though, their results indicate
a rather low success rate of 20% within 5 guesses when
inferring PINs that were entered while walking around.
Furthermore, their attack also works in completely dark
environments which does not hold for the ambient-light
sensor. However, our results indicate a better accuracy of
65% within 5 guesses when inferring unknown PINs.
The work of Simon and Anderson [45] additionally
requires the Camera permission which potentially gains
the user’s suspicion. In addition, their attack must deal
with the problem of audio-visual feedback, e.g., the shut-
ter sound or the LED, while capturing the required data.
Compared to their work we do not restrict our study to
specific input methods as long as the user holds the de-
vice while operating it. Furthermore, they need to trans-
fer image data to the server, which cannot be represented
as compact as sensor values.
To summarize this comparison, an attacker trades a
higher classification rate for two minor drawbacks when
using the ambient-light sensor.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we investigated a new type of side channel
which is based on the ambient-light sensor employed in
today’s mobile devices. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to show that the ambient-light sensor indeed
leaks sensitive information about the user’s input on the
touchscreen. We developed a proof-of-concept applica-
tion that allows us to infer unknown PINs, when given
a set of already known PINs. This application clearly
demonstrates that the leaked information represents a vi-
able side channel for compromising the user’s privacy
and security. Since no specific permission is required
to access this sensor, an adversary is able collect sen-
sitive inputs from mobile-device owners without raising
any suspicion and, thus, remain unrecognizable.
Any mobile device equipped with an ambient-light
sensor that provides a sufficiently high sampling rate and
resolution can be exploited. Our investigation showed
that state-of-the-art smartphones—from all major device
manufacturers—include an ambient-light sensor and the
rapid technical progress in combination with demanding
users possibly leads to an increasing resolution and sam-
pling frequency of this sensor. For a list of potential vul-
nerable devices see Appendix A.
There are many different dimensions among the infor-
mation leakage of sensors can be investigated. Examples
of factors affecting the applicability and performance of
sensor-based side-channel attacks are, for instance, the
sensor hardware itself, the screen dimension, the device
orientation, the keyboard layout, the user’s behavior and
his typing style, the different classification algorithms
and the employed feature vectors, the actual environ-
ment (e.g., indoor and outdoor), etc. These examples
demonstrate that further research is necessary to evalu-
ate the performance of all available sensors under differ-
ent settings in order to determine the best sensor for a
specific attack scenario. For instance, Cai and Chen [19]
as well as Al-Haiqi et al. [1] performed a comparison of
the gyroscope and the accelerometer for multiple users
on different devices in different settings to determine
the best motion-based sensor. It remains an open ques-
tion whether a combination of motion sensors with the
ambient-light sensor might lead to better performances
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than reported so far. However, the intention of this work
was to provide a first feasibility study. By comparing
three classification algorithms, different feature vectors,
different input methods, different environments, and the
impact of different sampling frequencies, we showed that
the ambient-light sensor provides a viable side channel.
Related work on the leakage of motion sensors
claimed that access to these sensors must be limited with
a fine-grained permission system. As shown in this work,
access to the ambient-light sensor must also be protected
through such a permission system and, thus, operating-
system developers need to deal with this problem. Prob-
ably even more important is the fact that users need to be
aware of such threats and be wary when installing appli-
cations that require permissions to access sensors. This
is actually why studies like this one are essential.
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A Mobile Devices Potentially at Risk
Table 4 lists Android-based mobile devices as well as the
empirically determined sampling frequencies and resolu-
tions of the light sensor. For the Google Nexus S running
Android 2.3.6 and the Samsung Galaxy SII running An-
droid 2.3.4 we state the observed lux values instead of
the actual resolutions.
Except the HTC Nexus One, all investigated devices
support a sampling rate that is high enough for the pre-
sented attack. For two devices, i.e., the Google Nexus
S running Android 2.3.6 and the Samsung Galaxy SII
running Android 4.3, the limiting factor seems to be the
resolution. The limited resolution in turn seems to be a
result of the employed operating system rather than the
hardware itself. For instance, the Google Nexus S run-
ning Cyanogenmod 4.0.4 provides a more fine-grained
resolution than the Google Nexus S running Android
2.3.6. This also complies with our observation that read-
ing the sensor values directly from the virtual file sys-
tem, e.g., /sys/devices/virtual/lightsensor/switch cmd on
the Samsung Galaxy SII, provides a better resolution than
using the official Android Sensor API.
Since this table contains only devices we had at hand,
we expect far more devices to be vulnerable to attacks
based on the ambient-light sensor.
Device Operating system Sample rate [Hz] Resolution [lux]
Google Nexus S Android 2.3.6 ∼ 20 {10, 160, 320, 640}
Google Nexus S Cyanogenmod 4.0.4 ∼ 140 1
HTC Nexus One Android 2.3.6 ∼ 1 1
LG Optimus G Android 4.1.2 ∼ 7 1
LG Optimus G Pro Android 4.1.2 ∼ 7 1
Samsung Galaxy SII Android 2.3.4 ∼ 10 {10, 100, 1000}
Samsung Galaxy SIII Android 4.3 ∼ 750 1
Samsung Galaxy S4 Mini Android 4.2.2 ∼ 100 1
Samsung Galaxy Note II Android 4.3 ∼ 100 1
Table 4: Mobile devices and their corresponding operating system as well as the observed sampling rate and the
resolution of the ambient-light sensor.
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